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Abstract
Several relaxations of Nash equilibrium are shown to exist in strategic games with discontinuous
payoff functions. Those relaxations are used to extend and unify several recent results and link Reny’s
better-reply security condition [Reny, P.J. (1999). On the Existence of Pure and Mixed Strategy Nash
Equilibria in Discontinuous Games. Econometrica, 67(5), 1029-1056.] to Simon-Zame’s endogenous
tie-breaking rules [Simon, L.K. and Zame, W.R. (1990). Discontinuous Games and Endogenous
Sharing Rules. Econometrica, 58, 861-872.].
JEL classification: C02, C62, C72.
Keywords: Discontinuous games, Nash equilibrium, Reny equilibrium, better-reply security, endoge-
nous sharing rule, quasi equilibrium, finite deviation equilibrium, symmetric games.
1 Introduction
Many classical problems in economics can be formulated as games with continuous strategy spaces and dis-
continuous payoff functions. Examples abound: price and spatial competitions, auctions, Nash-demand,
preemption, war of attrition, and general equilibrium among many others.
To study those problems, standard equilibrium existence results, such as Nash [30, 31] and Glicksberg
[14], fail. Under some “endogenous” tie-breaking rules on the discontinuity points, some of those games
admit an equilibrium. Under other rules, equilibria do not exist. For instance, in a standard Bertrand
game played by two firms with heterogeneous costs, a pure Nash equilibrium exists only when the ties
are broken in favor of the lower-cost firm. Two natural questions arise and have been addressed in the
literature. First, under which conditions does an equilibrium exist? Second, when a game does not admit
an equilibrium, should another solution concept be used instead, or is there some endogenous tie-breaking
rule under which an equilibrium does exist?
The first question is not only theoretical. For many games, such as pay-your-bid multi-unit auction,
an equilibrium exists but it cannot be constructed explicitly (Reny [34]). Consequently, various “well
behaving” conditions at discontinuities have been established in the literature, initiated by the seminal
papers of Dasgupta and Maskin ([11] and [12]). A great achievement has been established by Reny [34].
He proved that any better-reply secure BRS quasiconcave compact game admits a pure Nash equilibrium.
Reny’s BRS condition requires that whenever a strategy profile x is not a Nash equilibrium, then for any
limit vector payoff v = limxn→x u(xn), there is a player i that can “secure” more than vi (i.e. he has a
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deviation that guarantees strictly more than vi for all strategy profiles y−i in a neighborhood of x−i).
Reny’s paper has induced a large and still extremely active research agenda ([5], [3], [7], [8], [27], [35] and
[36]).
To the second question–which relaxation may be used when the model fails to have an equilibrium?–
two independent answers have been given. One of the most used relaxation is approximated equilibrium.
It is a limit point of ǫ-Nash equilibria as ǫ goes to 0. It exists in many standard games such as Bertrand
duopoly in pure strategies (the firm with the lowest cost prices slightly below the cost of her opponent)
and exists in mixed strategies in undiscounted two player stochastic games [41, 42] as well as timing
games [25]. Surprisingly, approximated equilibrium is much less used in economics applications, perhaps
because there is but one existence result, that of Prokopovych [33]. His conditions apply to Bertrand
duopoly but are of no help in stochastic and timing games where, in general, approximated equilibria are
explicitly constructed.
One of the main aims of this paper is to define simple conditions for the existence of an approximated
equilibrium that explain why all the models listed above admit such a solution. We are convinced
that Reny’s [34] BRS approach (which essentially establishes conditions on the closure of the graph
{(x, u(x)), x ∈ X} of the game) offers a key direction: any sequence of ǫn-equilibria induces an element
(x, v) = limn(xǫn , u(xǫn)) in the closure of the graph. The limit vector payoff v is a useful information
that partially captures how xǫ must tend to x. Consequently, a first step for establishing a useful “fixed
point” theorem for the existence of an approximated equilibrium is to get a deeper understanding of
Reny’s results by means of concepts that pertain to the closure of the graph of the game. For, one needs
deeper understanding of the BRS’s condition and, more importantly, one should establish a topological
proof of Reny’s result. Actually, the original proof [34] is non-standard and proceeds by contradiction to
construct a sequence of approximations by a family of Euclidean games on polytopes.
Our search led us naturally to explore a possible link with endogenous tie-breaking rules: if (x, v)
is an approximated equilibrium, and x is a discontinuity point, v will be the endogenous tie-breaking
rule at x. The exploration of this intuition gives rise to new questions and so new solution concepts
both in pure and mixed strategies. At the end, we have a consistent and unified picture with several
relaxations. Interestingly, most of them could be encompassed for games in mixed strategies (finite
deviation equilibrium), and when the game is symmetric (light equilibrium).
The idea of endogenous tie-breaking rules goes back to Simon-Zame [38]. As already observed by
Dagsputa and Maskin [12] and Reny [34], in most applications, discontinuities are situated in a low-
dimensional subspace of strategy profiles (firms or players choosing the same price, location, bid, acting
time, etc). In some of those games, the exogenously given tie-breaking rule leads to no pure Nash
equilibrium (Bertrand duopoly and Hotelling) or no mixed equilibrium (location games [39], 3-player
timing games [25], first price auction [13] and second price auction [20] among others). Often, however,
equilibrium may be restored if the tie-breaking rule is chosen endogenously (see Maskin-Riley [26] and
Kim-Che [24]).
Simon and Zame [38] argue convincingly that “payoffs should be viewed as only partially determined,
and that whenever the economic nature of the problem leads to indeterminacies, the sharing rule should be
determined endogenously.” They define a solution of the original game G to be a mixed Nash equilibrium
of a modified game G˜, close to G (roughly, the payoffs of the new game G˜ are convex combinations of
limit payoffs of G), and prove that any compact game admits a solution. The result has been extended
to strategic games with incomplete information by Jackson et al. [19].
The approaches of both Reny and Simon and Zame are widely used in economics and specifically
auctions to prove existence of an equilibrium or to restore its existence. This leads Jackson and Swinkel
[21] to ask if “these approaches turn out to be related”.
To establish our first formal link between the two main approaches in pure strategies, we introduce
two equivalent relaxations of Nash equilibrium: both defined on the closure of the graph of the game.
We show that these relaxations of Nash equilibrium exist in any quasiconcave compact game. A Reny
equilibrium is a strategy profile x and a limit vector payoff v such that no player i can secure more
than vi. A sharing rule equilibrium is a strategy profile x and a limit vector payoff v where x is a pure
Nash equilibrium of an auxiliary game G˜ with associated payoff v where utilities are modified only at
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discontinuity points with respect to two conditions (i) the new game is close to the original (i.e. its graph
is included in the closure of the graph of G) and (ii) utility functions in G˜ are bounded below by utility
levels that can be secured in G. Condition (i) is a strengthening of the notion of closeness considered
in Simon and Zame[38] (no convex hull is needed). Moreover, they do not require any lower bound on
utilities as our condition (ii) does. This answers an open question asked by Jackson et al [19]:“We should
emphasize that our results concern only the existence of solutions [sharing rules] in mixed strategies; we
have little to say about the existence of solutions [sharing rules] in pure strategies”.
Our findings unify Reny’s and Simon and Zame’s results in pure strategies. We show that sharing rule
and Reny equilibria coincide. Furthermore, we show that Nash and approximated equilibria are always
Reny equilibria and, a game is BRS if and only if Reny and Nash equilibria coincide.
Finally, the existence of Reny equilibrium in any quasiconcave compact game leads automatically to
a new class of games for which an approximated equilibrium does exist. Those are quasiconcave compact
games satisfying a weaker form of BRS: whenever (x, v) is not an approximated equilibrium, there is a
player i that can “secure” more than vi. This is shown to easily recover Prokopovych’s condition [33].
To establish a formal link between Reny and Simon and Zame in mixed strategies, we introduce a
refinement of Reny equilibrium. A finite deviation equilibrium (FDE) is a mixed strategy profilem and an
associated limit payoff vector v such that for any finite discretizationD of the game and any neighborhood
W of (m, v), there is (mD, u(mD)) in W such that no player i has a deviation di in D that increases
his payoff against the mixed profile mD−i. The concept is closely related to the finite deviation property
recently introduced by Reny [35, 36] who proves it to improve the better-reply security condition. A FDE
is proven to exist in any compact-metric game, to strictly refine Simon and Zame’s solution, and to not
exist for games in pure strategies.
To restrict as far as possible equilibrium conditions to capture the recent literature of discontinuous
games in pure strategies, we introduce another refinement of Reny equilibrium, mainly related to a
condition in Barelli and Soza [3]. A quasi-equilibrium is shown to exist in any quasiconcave compact
game and to have its equivalent sharing rule version (where only the lower bound on payoffs in condition
(ii) is improved). The existence proof of a quasi-equilibrium is a consequence of a new selection lemma
combined with a standard fixed point theorem a` la Brouwer. This allows us to encompass most of the
recent extensions of Reny’s BRS condition for a discontinuous game to admit a Nash equilibrium ([5],
[3], [7] and [8] among others).
Finally, other related solution concepts (single deviation, weak, tight and pseudo equilibrium) are
explored in pure strategies. Some are shown to always exist (tight and weak equilibrium), some do not
(single deviation and pseudo). This is used to show that our refinements are sharp in pure and mixed
strategies.
For symmetric, quasiconcave and compact games, we introduce the concept of light equilibrium. We
show it to exist and to refine symmetric single deviation, weak, tight, Reny and quasi equilibrium concepts.
This provides extremely sharp conditions for existence of symmetric Nash or approximated equilibria.
The proof is short and completely topological. This proves and improves Reny’s [34] BRS condition for
symmetric games.
Our three main objectives are now achieved: (1) a short topological proof for Reny’s result and its
recent extensions, (2) a unified picture of the literature in discontinuous games and (3) the identification
of a large class of games for which an approximated equilibrium exists. This opens the door to a new
and challenging research agenda for potential applications in stochastic games, auctions and industrial
organization.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the environment, notations and the main
approaches of the literature (Reny [34], Simon Zame [38] and Prokopovych [33]). Section 3 is devoted to
unify Reny’s, Simon Zame’s and Prokopovych’s results in pure strategies with the introduction of a new
equilibrium concept (that we call Reny equilibrium). Section 4 is devoted to link them for games in mixed
strategies throughout the introduction of the concept of finite deviation equilibrium. Section 5 presents
other new concepts that refine the previous one, improves our concepts in case of symmetric games, and
shows the sharpness of the results. Section 6 concludes. Appendix contains the most technical proofs.
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2 Three approaches to discontinuous games
This section recalls three approaches to Nash existence in discontinuous games, represented by better-
reply secure games [34], approximated equilibrium [33] and endogenous tie-breaking rules [38].
The paper considers games in strategic form with a finite set N of players.1 The pure strategy set Xi
of each player i ∈ N is a non-empty, compact subset of a (not necessarily Hausdorff or locally convex)
topological vector space. Each player i has a bounded payoff function ui : X =
∏
i∈N Xi → R. A strategic
form game G is thus a couple G = ((Xi)i∈N , (ui)i∈N ). Whenever G satisfies the above assumptions, it is
called compact. However, some results will need the space to be metric, Hausdorff, or locally convex.
As usual, for every x ∈ X and i ∈ N , denote x−i = (xj)j 6=i and X−i = Πj 6=iXj .
G is quasiconcave if for every player i ∈ N , Xi is convex and every strategy x−i ∈ X−i, the mapping
ui(·, x−i), defined on Xi, is quasiconcave.
G is continuous if for every player i, ui is a continuous mapping, where X is endowed with the product
topology. For every game G, Γ = {(x, u(x)) : x ∈ X} denotes its graph. Finally, let Γ be the closure of Γ
and Γx = {v ∈ R
N : (x, v) ∈ Γ} be the x-section of Γ. A pure Nash equilibrium of G is a strategy profile
x = (xi)i∈N ∈ X such that for every player i ∈ N and every deviation di ∈ Xi, ui(di, x−i) ≤ ui(x).
2.1 Better-reply secure games
In many discontinuous games, a Nash equilibrium exists. Reny’s [34] existence result explains why.
For every x ∈ X and every player i, define ui(di, x−i) the largest payoff player i can obtain when he
plays di and the other players may deviate slightly from x−i: formally,
ui(di, x−i) = lim inf
x′
−i
→x−i
ui(di, x
′
−i) = sup
V ∈V(x−i)
inf
x′
−i
∈V
ui(di, x
′
−i),
where V(x−i) denotes the set of neighborhoods of x−i. Hence, ui(xi, x−i) is just the lower semicontinuous
regularization of ui(xi, .) with respect to x−i. (The notation lim infx′
−i
→x−i is misleading since the strategy
space in not necessary metric: convergence should be understood is the sense of nets.)
Definition 1 A game is better-reply secure (BRS) if for every (x, v) ∈ Γ such that x is not a Nash
equilibrium, there exists i ∈ N and a deviation di ∈ Xi such that ui(di, x−i) > vi.
Theorem 2 (Reny [34]) Any better-reply secure quasiconcave compact game G admits a Nash equilib-
rium.
Reny [34] provides simple sufficient conditions under which a game is BRS.
Definition 3 A game is payoff secure if for every x ∈ X, every ε > 0 and every i ∈ N , there exists
di ∈ Xi and Vx−i , a neighborhood of x−i, such that ui(di, x
′
−i) ≥ ui(x) − ε for every x
′
−i ∈ Vx−i .
Equivalently, if for every i and x−i:
sup
di∈Xi
ui(di, x−i) = sup
di∈Xi
ui(di, x−i)
.
Definition 4 A game is reciprocally upper semicontinuous if whenever (x, v) ∈ Γ and u(x) ≤ v then
u(x) = v.
The last condition holds if the sum of utilities is upper semicontinuous. Reny [34] proves that any
payoff-secure and reciprocally upper semicontinuous game is better-reply secure.
1Games with an infinite number of players may naturally be used to study existence of perfect equilibria of a finite player
extensive form game with infinitely many decision nodes as soon as the single deviation property holds. In that case, finding
a perfect equilibrium is equivalent to finding a perfect equilibrium of a strategic form game with infinitely many players,
one for each decision node. Most of our solution concepts in pure strategies extend to infinitely many players (see section
5 and appendix).
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2.2 Approximated equilibrium
A natural and widely used relaxation of Nash is the following.
Definition 5 A pair (x, v) ∈ Γ is an approximated equilibrium if there exists a sequence2 (xn)n∈N of X
such that: (i) for every n ∈ N, xn is a 1n -equilibrium, that is: for every player i ∈ N and every deviation
di ∈ Xi, ui(di, xn−i) ≤ ui(x
n) + 1n . (ii) the sequence (x
n, u(xn)) converges to (x, v).
Let Vi(x−i) = supdi∈Xi ui(di, x−i) denotes the maximal payoff player i could obtain against x−i.
Theorem 6 (Prokopovych [33]) Any payoff-secure quasiconcave compact game G such that Vi is con-
tinuous for every i admits an approximated equilibrium.
2.3 Endogenous tie-breaking rules
A completely different answer to discontinuities has been proposed by Simon and Zame ([38]). They
prove existence of tie-breaking rules at discontinuity points so that the modified game admits a mixed
Nash equilibrium.
Let G = ((Xi)i∈N , (ui)i∈N ) be a game in strategic form. It is assumed to be compact-metric, that is,
the strategy sets Xi are compact and metrizable (but not necessary convex) and the utility functions are
measurable and bounded.
Denote by Mi = ∆(Xi) the set of Borel probability measures on Xi (i.e. the set of mixed strategies
of player i). This is also a compact-metrizable set under the weak* topology. Let M = ΠiMi. A mixed
equilibrium of G is a pure Nash equilibrium of its mixed extension G′ = ({Mi}i∈N , {ui}i∈N ) where utilities
are extended multi-linearly to M .
Definition 7 Let G be a compact-metric game. A double (σ, q) is a solution of G if σ ∈ M is a mixed
equilibrium of the auxiliary game in strategic form G˜ = ((Xi)i∈N , (qi)i∈N ) where the auxiliary utilities
q = (qi)i∈N must satisfy condition (SZ): ∀y ∈ X, q(y) ∈ coΓy, where co stands for the convex hull.
Condition (SZ) has implications. When ui is continuous at x then qi(x) = ui(x). When
∑
i ui(x)
is continuous then
∑
i qi(x) =
∑
i ui(x). This justifies our subsequent terminology sharing rule when
utilities are transferable. More generally, Jackson et al. [19] interpreted a tie-breaking rule as a proxy
for the outcome of an unmodeled second stage game. As example, they recall the analysis of first-price
auctions for a single indivisible object. Maskin and Riley [26] adjoin to the sealed-bid stage a second
stage where bidders with the highest bid in the first stage play a Vickrey auction. In the private value
setting, their dominant strategy is to bid their true values. Consequently, the second stage induces a
tie-breaking rule where the bidder with the highest value wins the object. A proper way of implementing
the tie-breaking rule is by asking players to send to the seller, in addition of their bids (in general their
strategies) their private values (in general a cheap message). The messages will be used only to break
ties. Jackson et al. [19] used this interpretation to extend their result to strategic games with incomplete
information.
Theorem 8 (Simon and Zame [38]) Any compact-metric game admits a solution.
3 Reny and sharing rule equilibrium in pure strategies
Jackson and Swinkel [21] asked whether there is a link between Simon and Zame’s and Reny’s results.
Before providing a formal link, consider two examples.
2Again, the definition is stated in term of sequences, while one should use convergence in the sense of nets. The choice
is made for simplicity of the presentation.
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Example 9 The California-Oregon location game is considered in the paper of Simon and Zame. The
length interval [0, 4] represents an interstate highway. The strategy space of player 1 (the psychologist
from California) is X = [0, 3] (representing the Californian highway stretch). The strategy space of
player 2 (the psychologist from Oregon) is Y = [3, 4] (the Oregon part of the highway). The payoff
function of player 1 is u1(x, y) =
x+y
2 if x < y and u1(3, 3) = 2. The payoff function of player 2 is
u2(x, y) = 4 − u1(x, y). This game is constant-sum, discontinuous and has no Nash equilibrium. Define
q(x) = u(x) for every x 6= (3, 3) and let q(3, 3) = (3, 1). The pure strategy profile (3, 3) with utility
profile q define clearly a solution a` la Simon and Zame. Here, the new sharing rule at (3, 3) has a simple
interpretation: it corresponds to giving each psychologist its natural market share.
Example 10 In a Bertrand duopoly, two firms i = 1, 2 choose prices pi ∈ [0, a] (a > 0). Assume a linear
demand a−min(p1, p2) and marginal costs c1 < c2 <
a+c1
2 . The game has no pure Nash equilibrium if
one assumes that the firm charging the lowest price supplies the entire market. Nevertheless, the game
is quasiconcave and compact. This game, has a solution with strategy profile (c2, c2) and with payoff
profile q(c2, c2) = ((a− c2)(c2− c1), 0) and q(x) = u(x) elsewhere. This equilibrium profile may be related
to another standard tool to circumvent the non-existence of a Nash equilibrium: just assume that there
is a smallest monetary unit δ > 0. Then, the strategy profile (c2 − δ, c2) is a Nash equilibrium of this
discretized game for every δ > 0 small enough. The associated payoff vector is ((c2−δ−c1)(a−c2+δ), 0).
As δ goes to zero, one obtains the Simon and Zame solution.
Several remarks are of interest. Both examples yield a solution (a` la Simon and Zame) in pure
strategies, yet Simon and Zame’s solution is stated in mixed strategies. Second, the solutions happen
to be approximated equilibria in both cases (in Example 9, consider the sequence of 1n -Nash equilibria
(3− 1n , 3), and in Example 10, the sequence (c2 −
1
n , c2)). Finally, the games are not better-reply secure
and so Reny’s result seems of no help to explain why. Yet, as proved below, Reny’s result permits to
understand why those games have a solution a` la Simon and Zame in pure strategies and that this solution
is indeed an approximated equilibrium.
Definition 11 A couple (x, v) ∈ Γ is a sharing rule equilibrium of G if x is a Nash equilibrium of an
auxiliary game G˜ = ((Xi)i∈N , (qi)i∈N ), v = q(x) is the associated vector payoff and:
(i) For every y ∈ X, q(y) ∈ Γy.
(ii) For every player i ∈ N and every di ∈ Xi, qi(di, x−i) ≥ ui(di, x−i).
In words, a sharing rule equilibrium is a profile x and a payoff vector v such that x is a classical
Nash equilibrium of an auxiliary game and v is the associated payoff. Without conditions on G˜, any
strategy profile could be made a Nash equilibrium of some auxiliary game. To reduce the number of
solutions, the new game must be as close as possible to the original game. For, some restrictions are
necessary. Condition (i) is weaker that condition (SZ): no convex hull is taken. It says that q(y) could
be obtained as a limit point of some u(yn) as yn goes to y. Thus, only payoffs at discontinuity points of
u are modified. Condition (ii) asks that the payoff of a player in the auxiliary game remains above the
payoff he can secure in the original game. Such a lower bound is not required by Simon and Zame. The
following example shows its importance.
Example 12 Consider a one-player game who maximizes over [0, 1] the following discontinuous utility
function: u(x) = 0 if x < 1, and u(1) = 1. The most natural solution is clearly the profile x = 1 yielding
the highest possible payoff. But the constant payoff function q = 0 satisfies condition (i). So, any mixed
strategy profile σ is a solution a` la Simon and Zame! When condition (ii) is added, q = u is the unique
remaining utility function.
More generally, in a one player game, the upper semicontinuous regularization of u:
uu.s.c.(x) = lim sup
x′→x
u(x′),
6
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satisfies (i) and (ii). For two players or more, the utility profile q = (uu.s.c.i )i∈N may not satisfy (i) or
even (SZ). Examples are easy to find.
The following result extends and refines Simon and Zame in pure strategies. This was an open question
in Jackson et al [19].
Theorem 13 Any quasiconcave compact game G admits a sharing rule equilibrium.
To prove existence of sharing rule equilibrium, we introduce the following new equilibrium concept,
inspired by the Reny BRS condition.
Definition 14 A Reny equilibrium is a couple (x, v) ∈ Γ such that
∀i ∈ N, sup
di∈Xi
ui(di, x−i) ≤ vi.
A possible interpretation follows. Players in the game are called to play some profile xn close to the
Reny equilibrium profile x, whose payoff is 1/n close to v. No player has a deviation that secures strictly
more than his Reny equilibrium payoff.
Theorem 15 Any quasiconcave compact game G admits a Reny equilibrium.
Without surprise, the proof is a logical consequence of Reny [34]:
Proof of Theorem 15. Assume, by contradiction, that there is no Reny equilibrium (and so no
Nash equilibrium by Proposition 16). This implies that the game is better-reply secure. Consequently,
from Reny [34], there exists a Nash equilibrium, which is a Reny equilibrium, a contradiction.

Proof of Theorem 13.
From Theorem 15, there exists a Reny equilibrium (x, v) ∈ Γ. Then, one can build the sharing rule
equilibrium as follows: for every i ∈ N and di ∈ Xi, first denote by S(di, x−i) the space of sequences
(xn−i)n∈N ofX−i converging to x−i such that limn→+∞ ui(di, x
n
−i) = ui(di, x−i). Then, define q : X → R
N
by
q(y) =


v if y = x,
any limit point of (u(di, x
n
−i))n∈IN if y = (di, x−i) for some i ∈ N, di 6= xi, (x
n
−i)n∈N ∈ S(di, x−i),
q(y) = u(y) otherwise.
Now, prove that x is a sharing rule equilibrium profile associated to q. Since (x, v) ∈ Γ, and by
definition of q, condition (i) of definition 11 is satisfied at x. Obviously, it is satisfied at every y different
from x for at least two components, and also at every (di, x−i) with di 6= xi, from the definition of
q(di, x−i) in this case. To prove condition (ii) of definition 11, let i ∈ N and di ∈ Xi. If di = xi then
qi(di, x−i) = qi(x) = vi ≥ ui(x) because (x, v) is a Reny equilibrium. If di 6= xi then qi(di, x−i) =
ui(di, x−i) so that condition (ii) holds.

The following proposition links Reny, Nash, approximated and sharing rule equilibria.
Proposition 16 i) Reny and sharing rule equilibria coincide.
ii) If x ∈ X is a Nash equilibrium, (x, u(x)) is a Reny equilibrium.
iii) If (x, v) ∈ Γ is an approximated equilibrium, (x, v) is a Reny equilibrium.
iv) A game is better-reply secure if and only if Nash and Reny equilibria coincide.
Proof. Part i) is a consequence of the last proof and the definition of a sharing rule equilibrium. For
ii), if x ∈ X is a Nash equilibrium, then for every player i ∈ N and every deviation di ∈ Xi, one has
ui(x) ≥ ui(di, x−i) ≥ ui(di, x−i). For iii), if (x, v) ∈ Γ is an approximated equilibrium, then let (xn)n∈N
be a sequence of 1n -equilibria such that (x
n, u(xn)) converges to (x, v). For every n ∈ N, for every player
i ∈ N and every deviation di ∈ Xi, one has ui(di, xn−i) ≤ ui(x
n) + 1n . Passing to the infimum limit when
7
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n tends to infinity, one obtains ui(di, x−i) ≤ vi. To finish, iv) is a straightforward consequence of the
definitions of Reny equilibrium and better-reply security.
This opens the door to a large class of games for which an approximated equilibrium exists. This
class may be improved for every refinement of Reny equilibrium.
Definition 17 G is approximately better-reply secure if for every (x, v) ∈ Γ, if (x, v) is not an approxi-
mated equilibrium then there exists i ∈ N and a deviation di ∈ Xi such that ui(di, x−i) > vi.
A different characterization is given in the appendix. From the existence of a Reny equilibrium one
immediately obtains.
Theorem 18 Any approximately better-reply secure quasiconcave compact game G admits an approxi-
mated equilibrium.
Interestingly, Prokopovych’s [33] result may easily be derived from the above theorem.
Corollary 19 A payoff-secure compact game G such that Vi is continuous for every i is approximately
better-reply secure.
Recall that Vi(x−i) = supdi∈Xi ui(di, x−i) and that a game is payoff secure if and only if: Vi(x−i) =
supdi∈Xi ui(di, x−i).
Proof. Take (x, v) ∈ Γ a Reny equilibrium, and prove it to be an approximated equilibrium. Since
G is payoff secure at x ∈ X , one has supdi∈Xi ui(di, x−i) = supdi∈Xi ui(di, x−i) = Vi(x−i). From Reny
equilibrium condition one has Vi(x−i) ≤ vi. From the continuity of Vi, for every ǫ > 0 and every
neighborhood Vx of x, there exists x
′ ∈ Vx such that | vi − ui(x′) |≤
ǫ
2 and supdi∈Xi ui(di, x
′
−i) ≤
supdi∈Xi ui(di, x−i) +
ǫ
2 , which completes the proof, since x
′ is an ǫ−equilibrium.
The existence of a Reny equilibrium also simplifies the proof that a payoff secure and reciprocally
upper semicontinuous game is better-reply secure [34].
Actually, let (x, v) be a Reny equilibrium, then supdi∈Xi ui(di, x−i) ≤ vi. Since the game is payoff
secure one obtains supdi∈Xi ui(di, x−i) ≤ vi. Taking d = x one deduces that u(x) ≤ v. Since the game is
reciprocally upper semicontinuous one obtains that v = u(x). Consequently, x is a Nash equilibrium.
Games in Examples 9 and 10 are approximately better-reply secure. The first does not satisfy
Prokopovych’s conditions. We have now a better understanding and a unified picture about the three
important approaches for discontinuous games in pure strategies. The key is Reny equilibrium whose
existence is a trivial consequence of Reny’s main result [34].
4 Finite deviation equilibrium in mixed strategies
Let G be a compact metric game, G′ be its mixed extension and let Γ′ be the closure of the graph of G′.
The following definition is related to a condition in Reny [35, 36].
Definition 20 (m, v) ∈ Γ′ is a finite deviations equilibrium (FDE) of G if for every open set V m,v that
contains (m, v) and every finite sets Di ⊂ Xi, i = 1, ..., N , there exists m′ ∈M such that:
• (m′, u(m′)) ∈ V m,v;
• ∀i, ∀di ∈ Di : ui(di,m′−i) ≤ ui(m
′).
This relaxed equilibrium concept is extremely intuitive. It says that m with payoff u is “almost” a
usual Nash mixed equilibrium since for any finite set of pure deviations Di ⊂ Xi, there is m′ as close as
one wishes to m with a payoff u(m′) as close as one wishes to v such that no player i has a deviation
against m′ when he is restricted to use only deviations in D.
8
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Theorem 21 Any compact metric game G admits a FDE.
Proof. Let us construct explicitly a particular one using finite approximations. Let D the set of all
finite subsets Πi∈NDi of X . Consider the inclusion relation on D (which is a reflexive, transitive and
binary): then, each pair Πi∈NDi and Πi∈ND
′
i in D has an upper bound Πi∈N (Di∪D
′
i) in D. The couple
(D,⊂) is called a directed set. To every D = Πi∈NDi ∈ D, one can associate (mD, u(mD)) where mD
is a mixed equilibrium of the mixed extension of D. This defines a mapping from D to Γ′, called a net
(of Γ′). Then, a limit point (m, v) ∈ Γ′ of the net (mD, u(mD))D∈D by the following property: for every
neighborhood Vm,v of (m, v) and every D = Πi∈NDi ∈ D, there exists D
′ ∈ D with D ⊂ D′ such that
(mD
′
, u(mD
′
)) ∈ Vm,v. Such a limit point (m, v) exists because every net in a compact set has a limit
point, and is clearly a FDE.
Observe that any Nash equilibrium is a FDE: this is a relaxation of the concept of Nash. Not
surprising, a finite deviation equilibrium is a refinement of Reny equilibrium.
Proposition 22 Any finite deviation equilibrium (m, v) is a Reny equilibrium.
Proof. A finite deviation equilibrium implies that for every d ∈ X and every V a neighborhood of
(m, v), there exists (m′, u(m′) ∈ V such that for any i, ui(di,m′−i) ≤ ui(m
′). Tending V to {(m, v)}
yields a Reny equilibrium.
Proposition 23 Any finite deviation equilibrium (m, v) is a solution a` la Simon Zame.
The converse is false as shown in example 12.
Proof. Since we are in a metric game, there exists a sequence of finite sets Πi∈ND
n
i that converges
to X and a sequence of profiles mn such that (mn, u(mn)) converges (m, v), and such that ∀i, ∀di ∈ Dni :
ui(di,m
n
−i) ≤ ui(m
n). Then we follow Simon and Zame’s [38] proof.
5 Other concepts and link with literature
To cover some recent extensions of Reny’s [34] Nash existence result in pure strategies described below
(Barelli and Soza [3] and Reny [35]), one needs to refine Reny (and so sharing rule) equilibrium.
In definition 11 of sharing rule equilibrium the mapping qi is required to lay above the security utility
level ui. The higher the lower bound, the sharper is the concept. This is the key idea of the next
improvements. Other directions are explored, in particular symmetric games.
5.1 Strong sharing rules
Define the following regularization of ui, following a clever idea of Barelli and Soza [3]. It allows the
deviating player to choose regular deviation maps that react to small perturbations of the opponents.
ui(di, x−i) := supU∈V(x−i) supΦi∈WU (di,x−i) infx′−i∈U,d′i∈Φi(x′−i) ui(d
′
i, x
′
−i), (1)
where WU (di, x−i) is the set Kakutani multi-valued mappings from U to Xi (i.e. having a closed graph
and non-empty and convex values) such that di ∈ Φi(x−i)). The difference with ui is that player i can
now adapt his deviation di regularly to small perturbations of the opponents. Of course, ui(di, x−i) ≥
ui(di, x−i) since one can take constant mapping Φi(y) = di in the supremum in Equation 1. Theorem 13
concerning sharing rules could be improved as follows.
A game has the Kakutani [22] property if any correspondence from X to X that has a closed graph
and non-empty convex values admit a fixed point. This is the case for example if the topological vector
space is locally convex and Hausdorff [1]. Recent results in topology proves it for complete metric spaces
[23].
9
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Theorem 24 Any quasiconcave compact game G that have the Kakutani property admits a strong shar-
ing rule equilibrium: that is, there exists (x, v) ∈ Γ such that x is a pure Nash equilibrium of some game
G˜ = ((Xi)i∈N , (qi)i∈N ), with associated payoff v = q(x) and the following two conditions hold:
(i) for every y ∈ X, q(y) ∈ Γy.
(ii) For every player i ∈ N and every di ∈ Xi, qi(di, x−i) ≥ ui(di, x−i).
To prove this theorem, we need to introduce the corresponding improvement of Reny’s equilibrium,
presented in the next section.
5.2 Quasi equilibrium
Theorem 25 Any quasiconcave compact game G that has the Kakutani property admits a quasi equi-
librium: that is, there is (x, v) ∈ Γ: ∀i ∈ N, supdi∈Xi ui(di, x−i) ≤ vi, or equivalently if for every
i:
sup
V ∈V(x−i)
sup
Φi∈WV
inf
x′
−i
∈V,di∈Φi(x′−i)
ui(di, x
′
−i) ≤ vi,
where WV is the set of Kakutani multi-valued mapping from V to Xi.
A game G is generalized better-reply secure if: whenever (x, v) ∈ Γ and x is not a Nash equilibrium,
there is i and di such that: ui(di, x−i) > vi.
This means that player i admits locally (around x−i) a regular deviation mapping that guarantees vi
(i.e. there is a neighborhood V of x−i and a Kakutani mapping Φi from V to Xi such that forall x
′
−i ∈ V
and all di ∈ Φi(x′−i), one has ui(di, x
′
−i) > vi). In the Reny BRS condition, di is restricted to be the
same in the neighborhood of x−i, here it can vary but in a regular way.
Corollary 26 [Barelli and Soza [3]] Any generalized better-reply secure quasiconcave compact game G
that has the Kakutani property admits a Nash equilibrium
This result extends McLennan et al. [27] (in the quasiconcave case) and Carmona [7]. We improve it
in the next section throughout the new concept of tight equilibrium, whose completely topological proof
is established in the appendix.
The following quasiconcave compact 2-player game is an illustration of the difference between quasi
and Reny equilibria, or equivalently between sharing and strong sharing rules. See Barelli and Soza [3]
for other examples and applications.
Example 27 The strategy spaces are X = Y = [0, 1]. Player 1’s payoff is u1(x, y) = −1 if x 6= y and
u1(x, y) = 1 if x = y. Player 2’s payoff is u1(x, y) = −1 if y < 1, u1(x, 1) = 1 if x < 1 and u1(1, 1) = −2.
There is no Nash equilibrium, and only one sharing rule equilibrium profile (1, 1). However, there is two
possible associated utility functions q’s: for (x, y) = (1, 1) we have two possibilities: q(1, 1) = (−1, 1) or
q′(1, 1) = (1,−1). For (x, y) 6= (1, 1), there are no choice and one should define q′(x, y) = q(x, y) =
u(x, y). In both cases condition (i) is satisfied and the profile (1, 1) is the only Nash equilibrium of
the auxiliary game. But the choice q′ seems better than q, since in this case no player sees his payoff
decreasing compared to the original game. In fact, only q′ satisfies condition (ii) the strong sharing rule
equilibrium because u1(1, 1) = 1. Since u1(1, 1) = −1, q satisfies condition (ii) of the weak version of
sharing rule equilibrium. Consequently, the strong version is a strict refinement of weak version.
5.3 Single deviation equilibrium
A natural question arises. Since finite deviation equilibrium refines Reny equilibrium in mixed strategies,
does such an equilibrium exists in pure strategies? The following concept also refines Reny equilibrium
and is a relaxation of finite deviation equilibrium.
10
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Definition 28 x ∈ X is a single deviations equilibrium (SDE) if for every open set V that contains x
and every deviation d, there exists x′ ∈ V such that for every i, ui(di, x′−i) ≤ ui(x
′).
This is related to a condition in Reny [35]. A game has the single deviation property if whenever
x ∈ X is not a Nash equilibrium, there is an open set V that contains x and a deviation d such that for
any x′ ∈ V there is i such that: ui(di, x′−i) > ui(x
′). Reny [35] constructed a quasiconcave compact game
that satisfies the single deviation property but has no Nash equilibrium. This shows that, in contrast
with games in mixed strategies, single (and so finite) deviation equilibria may fail to exist.
5.4 Tight equilibrium
To overcome the problem of non-existence above, Reny [35] introduced the following small change in the
definition. He proves its existence in general topological vector spaces but, to our knowledge, he did not
publish the proof yet. We provide a proof of his result in the appendix.
Definition 29 A game G has the lower single deviation property if whenever x ∈ X is not a Nash
equilibrium, there exists d ∈ X and a neighborhood V of x such that for every z ∈ V , there exists a player
i, such that
∀x′ ∈ V, ui(di, x
′
−i) > ui(z)
This leads naturally to the following concept.
Definition 30 A profile x ∈ X is a lower single deviation equilibrium (LSDE) if for every d ∈ X and
every neighborhood V of x, there is z ∈ V , such that for every player i:
∃x′ ∈ V, ui(di, x
′
−i) ≤ ui(z)
This notion has the advantage to not be defined on the closure of the graph. It implies Reny equilib-
rium: if x is a LSDE then, shrinking V to x and taking v to be a limit in the sense of nets of u(z), one
obtains a Reny equilibrium (x, v). The existence of a LSDE cannot be deduced from the existence of a
quasi equilibrium and LSDE do not imply quasi equilibirum.
A natural question arises: is it possible to extend both ideas in one equilibrium concept? This leads
us to the following new concept and result.
Theorem 31 Every quasiconcave compact game G that has the Kakutani property admits a tight equi-
librium: that is, there exists x ∈ X such that for every neighborhood V of x and every (Φi)i∈N in
Πi∈NWV (x−i), there exists z ∈ V such that for every i ∈ N there exists x′ ∈ V and d′i ∈ Φi(x
′
−i)
such that uΦii (d
′
i, x
′
−i) ≤ ui(z), where u
Φ
i (di, x
′
−i) denotes the lower semicontinuous regularization of the
restriction of ui to the set {(ai, b−i) ∈ Xi × V : ai ∈ Φi(b−i)} at (di, x′−i).
Observe that this result could be applied to the game G or to its lower semicontinuous regularization
G = ((Xi)
N
i=1, (ui)
N
i=1). Actually, if G is quasiconcave and compact, G also is (see, for example, [8] p.
11). This is of course the case almost of the results in pure strategies of our paper.
This theorem is the most technical and conceptual contribution of the paper. It implies Reny, lower-
single deviation and quasi equilibrium (by shrinking V to {x}) and so strong sharing rules. Its proof is
in the appendix. It is the consequence of a new selection lemma combined with Kakutani [22] fixed point
theorem.
When deviation maps are taken to be constant (as in the lower single deviation equilibrium), the
proof uses another fixed point theorem (Browder-Fan [32]) that does not need the TVS to be Hausdorff
or locally convex: the topological assumptions needed for existence mainly depend on the structure of
the deviation maps. This is not surprising.
Corollary 32 If G = ((Xi)
N
i=1, (ui)
N
i=1) has the lower single deviation property then the set of tight
equilibria of the regularized game G = ((Xi)
N
i=1, (ui)
N
i=1) is included in the set of Nash equilibria of G.
11
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Thus G admits a tight equilibrium and so G has a Nash equilibrium. Consequently:
Corollary 33 [Reny [35]] Every quasiconcave compact game G that has the lower single deviation prop-
erty admits a Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 58 allows us to combine Barelli-Soza’s result (corollary 26) and Reny’s result (corollary 33)
as follows.
Definition 34 A game has the generalized deviation property if whenever x is not a Nash equilibrium,
there is a neighborhood V of x and (Φi)i∈N in Πi∈NWV (x−i) such that for every z ∈ V there is i, there
is x′ ∈ V and d′i ∈ Φi(x
′
−i) such that u
Φi
i (d
′
i, x
′
−i) > ui(z).
Theorem 35 Every quasiconcave compact game G that has the Kakutani and the generalized deviation
property admits a Nash equilibrium.
5.5 Weak equilibrium
To overcome non-existence of single deviation equilibrium, another slight change in the definition leads
us to the following concept.
Definition 36 A strategy profile x ∈ X is a weak equilibrium if for every open set V that contains x,
every player i and every deviation di ∈ Xi, there exists x′ ∈ V such that ui(di, x′−i) ≤ ui(x
′).
Stated differently, x is a weak equilibrium if no player i has a robust deviation, meaning that he has
no deviation di such that ui(di, x
′
−i) > ui(x
′) for all x′ in some neighborhood of x. This would be a
standard Nash equilibrium of the game where each player believes that the other players can do mistakes,
the player has no idea about how mistakes happen, and so preserves himself against the worst possible
scenario.
The difference with single deviation equilibrium is sharp: the perturbation x′ is now depending on
the identity of the player. Surprisingly:
Theorem 37 Any quasiconcave compact game G admits a weak equilibrium.
Contrary to Reny equilibrium, the proof is now a direct consequence of a standard fixed point theorem.
Proof. For every player i = 1, ..., N , define the multivalued mapping Φi from Xi to X as follows:
∀x ∈ X, Φi(x) = {di ∈ Xi : ∃Vx ∈ V(x) | ∀x
′ ∈ Vx, ui(di, x
′
−i) > ui(x
′)}.
For every player i, Φi has open fibers (i.e., for every di ∈ Xi, Φ
−1
i (di) is open), convex images, and
xi /∈ Φi(x) for every x ∈ X . Thus, we obtain existence from the Browder-Fan theorem [32].
Definition 38 A game G is strongly secure if for every strategy profile x ∈ X which is not a Nash
equilibrium, there exists a player i, a deviation di ∈ Xi and a neighborhood V of x, such that
∀x′ ∈ V, ui(di, x
′
−i) > ui(x
′)
Consequently:
Theorem 39 Any strongly secure quasiconcave compact game G admits a Nash equilibrium.
Applications
a) If for every i, ui is upper semicontinuous in x and lower semicontinuous in x−i, then G is strongly
secure. This implies the Nash existence result of Dasgupta and Maskin [11].
b) If for every i, ui is pseudo-continuous, meaning that that for every x ∈ X and every x0 ∈ X such
that ui(x0) < ui(x), lim supx′→x0 ui(x
′) < ui(x), and similarly for −ui, then clearly G is strongly secure.
This implies the Nash existence result of Morgan and Scalzo [29].
12
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c) Since the Browder-Fan theorem [32] holds for any cardinality of N, a weak equilibrium exists
in any quasiconcave compact game with infinitely many players. This may be used to prove existence
of sequential equilibria in dynamic games. If G is an extensive form game with perfect recall with a
denumerable number of players where at each information set, the player who plays at that information
set has finitely many actions (less that some fixed bound K) and if the payoff function is continuous for
each player for the product topology on the set of plays, then the agent normal form game in which a
player at information set I is constrained to use each action with probability ε > 0 is continuous and
quasiconcave. Thus, it admits a mixed Nash equilibrium. letting ε → 0 yields to a perfect and thus a
sequential and thus subgame perect Nash equilibrium of G.
d) Reny and tight equilibria also exist independently on the cardinality ofN (the proof in the appendix
does use the finiteness of the N). Consequently, one may expect that generalized better-reply security
and strong security may help to establish existence of Nash or approximated subgame perfect equilibria
in discontinuous dynamics games.
Links with Reny and approximated equilibria
In a one player game, the set of weak equilibria is included in the set of approximated equilibria. The
inclusion may be strict (while Reny and approximated equilibria coincide in that case).
Example 40 Take X = [0, 2] and u : [0, 2] → R defined as follows: u(x) = x for every x ∈ [0, 1),
u(x) = 0 for every x ∈ [1, 2) and u(2) = 1. Then x = 1 is a approximated equilibrium of G, but is not a
weak-equilibrium.
The same happens in the following quasiconcave compact two player game. Moreover, the example is
strongly secure but not better-reply secure.
Example 41 Each player’s strategy set is [0, 1]. Define u1, the payoff function of player 1, as follows:
u1(1, y) = 1 for every y ∈ [0, 1]; u1(x, 0) = 0 for every x ∈ [0, 1); finally, u1(x, y) = 1− y if x 6= 1 and if
y 6= 0. Define u2, the payoff function of player 2, by u2(x, y) = 1−y. Then, (0, 0) is an approximated equi-
librium, since (0, 1n ) is a
1
n -equilibrium for every n. But (0, 0) is not a weak-equilibrium. The only weak-
equilibrium is (1, 0) which is also the only Nash equilibrium of the game (so the game is strongly secure).
It is not better-reply secure: take (x, u) = ((0, 0), (1, 1)) ∈ Γ, where (1, 1) = limn→∞(u1(
1
n ,
1
n ), u1(
1
n ,
1
n )).
Conversely, it is false that better-reply security implies strong security, as the following quasiconcave
compact two player game proves.
Example 42 Each player’s strategy set is [0, 1]. Define u1(x, y) = 0 if y ≥ x and u1(x, y) = 1 otherwise.
Let u2(x, y) = 0 if x ≥ y and u2(x, y) = 1 otherwise. The game is better reply-secure but not strongly
secure at (0, 0).
Last, one can define the following class of games for which an approximated equilibrium exists, and
which covers the case of California-Oregon location game:
Definition 43 G is approximately strongly secure if for every x ∈ X, if x is not an approximated
equilibrium then there exists a player i, a deviation di ∈ Xi and a neighborhood V of x, such that
∀x′ ∈ V, ui(di, x
′
−i) > ui(x
′)
Theorem 44 Any approximately strongly secure quasiconcave compact game G admits an approximated
equilibrium.
The advantage of weak-equilibrium and strong security are their simplicity. The drawback, compared
to Reny equilibrium, is the absence of a limit payoff vector associated with the weak equilibrium strat-
egy profile. Moreover, the following example shows that he has no predicting power when the set of
discontinuities is a dense set. Of course, this never occurs in applications.
Example 45 There is only one player. Suppose X = [0, 1] and u(x) = 2x for x rational and u(x) = 0
when x is irrational. The set of weak equilibria is [0, 1] while a rational player must choose some rational
number close to 1 and expect to obtain a payoff close to 2.
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5.6 Light equilibrium for symmetric games
For symmetric games, most of the ideas could be combined in one to obtain the following weak condition
for existence of a symmetric Nash equilibrium: whenever a player has a profitable deviation, he has
locally a regular profitable deviation map (when the other players are restricted to symmetric profiles).
Define a (quasi) symmetric game as follows: for every players i, j, assume Xi = Xj (denoted Y
hereafter). Moreover, for every x, y ∈ Y , assume u1(x, y, ..., y) = u2(y, x, y, ..., y) = ... = uN(y, ..., y, x)
(denoted u(x, y, ..., y) hereafter). For y ∈ Y let y ∈ X be the symmetric profile (y, y, ...y) and similarly
for y−i ∈ X−i.
A symmetric game is diagonally quasi-concave if Y is convex, and for every player i, every x1, ..., xm ∈
Y and every x¯ ∈ co{x1, ..., xm},
u(x¯) ≥ min
1≤k≤m
u(xk, x¯−i).
Finally, y = (y, ..., y) ∈ X is a symmetric Nash equilibrium if for every d ∈ Y , u(d,y−i) ≤ u(y).
Theorem 46 Every diagonally quasi-concave symmetric compact game that has the Kakutani property,
admits a light equilibrium y = (y, ..., y), that is, for every Vy a neighborhood of y ∈ Y and every Kakutani
correspondence Φ from Vy to Y , there is z ∈ Vy and d ∈ Φ(z) such that u(d, z−i) ≤ u(z).
The fact that there is only one utility function to consider (no quantifier with respect to the identity
of player i is needed), and since the same z in Vy is present is the two sides of the equilibrium inequality, a
light equilibrium refines symmetric tight equilibrium, symmetric weak equilibrium and symmetric single
deviation equilibrium. Also, shrinking Vy to {y} and considering a limit point v of u(z), one obtains a
symmetric quasi equilibrium which is in particular a symmetric Reny equilibrium.
Our proof is short and proceeds by contradiction, then it concatenates the local deviation maps, to
obtain a global Kakutani deviation map whose fixed point provides a contradiction. A similar idea is
used to prove existence of a tight.
Proof. By contradiction, suppose no light equilibrium exits. Then, for every y ∈ Y , there exists Vy
a neighborhood of y and a Kakutani correspondence Φ from Vy to Y such that such for all z ∈ Vy and
all d ∈ Φ(z), u(d, z−i) > u(z).
From the compactness of Y , there exists a finite subset {y1, ..., yK} of Y , and for every k = 1, ..., K,
there exists a Kakutani correspondence Φk from some neighborhood Vyk of yk to Y and where Vy1 , ...,
VyK is a finite covering of Y . Let β1, ..., βK be a partition of unit subordinate to the covering Vy1 , ...,
VyK . Each βk is a continuous function from Y in [0, 1], with support in Vyk and
∑K
k=1 βk = 1. Define
Φ(z) =
∑K
k=1 βk(z)Φk(z). It is a Kakutani correspondence from Y to it self. Thus, it has a fixed
point z. Thus, there is for each k where βk(z) > 0, zk ∈ Φk(z) such that z =
∑K
k=1 βk(z)zk. But,
u(zk, z−i) > u(z), and by diagonally quasi-concavity, one deduces that u(z) > u(z): a contradiction.
Consequently:
Theorem 47 Let G be a diagonally quasi-concave symmetric compact game that has the Kakutani prop-
erty. Suppose that for every symmetric profile y = (y, ..., y) which not a Nash (resp. approximated)
equilibrium there is Vy a neighborhood of y ∈ Y , there is a Kakutani correspondence Φ from Vy to Y ,
such that for every z ∈ Vy and every d ∈ Φ(z), u(d, z−i) > u(z). Then G admits a symmetric Nash (resp.
approximated) equilibrium.
Thus, in symmetric games, Reny [34] BRS condition could be improved and proved much more directly
than Reny did.
5.7 Generalized weak equilibrium
A natural question arises. Could weak equilibrium (based on single deviations) be extended to maps
deviations, as it is the case in quasi, thigh and light equilibria?
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Definition 48 A strategy profile x ∈ X is a generalized weak equilibrium if for every open set V that
contains x, every player i and every Kakutani mapping Φi from V to Xi, there exists x
′ ∈ V and
di ∈ Φi(x′) such that ui(di, x′−i) ≤ ui(x
′).
Hence, x is a generalized weak equilibrium if no player i has a regular deviation map in the neighbor-
hood of x.
Theorem 49 Any quasiconcave compact game G that has the Kakutani property admits a generalized
weak equilibrium.
The proof is the same as in light equilibrium but with one addition difficulty: we should deal with
many utility functions, instead of one.
Proof. By contradiction, suppose no generalized weak equilibrium exits. Then, for every x ∈ X ,
there exists Vx a neighborhood of x, there is a player i and a Kakutani mapping Φi from Vx to Xi such
that such for all z ∈ Vx and all di ∈ Φi(z), ui(di, z−i) > u(z).
From the compactness of X , there exists {x1, ..., xK} in X , there is K players i1, ..., iK and Kakutani
mappings Φik from some neighborhood Vxk of xk to Xik such that Vx1 , ..., VxK is a finite covering of X .
Let β1, ..., βK be a partition of unit adapted to the covering Vx1 , ..., VxK . For each k, extend Φik (defined
from Vxk to Xik) to a correspondence Ψik defined from Vxk to X as follows:
Ψik(x) = Φik(x) × {x−i}.
Define now Ψ(x) =
∑K
k=1 βk(x)Ψik (x). It is a Kakutani correspondence from X to it self: it has a fixed
point z. Thus, there is dik ∈ Φik(z) such that z =
∑K
k=1 βk(z)(dik , z−ik). Consequently, for each player
i = ik for some k, one has (zi, z−i) =
∑
k:i=ik
[ βk(z)∑
k:i=i
k
βk(z)
](dik , z−i). But, ui(dik , z−i) > u(z), and by
quasi-concavity, one deduces that u(z) > u(z): a contradiction.
This leads us to the following class of games.
Definition 50 A game G admits the regular deviation property if whenever x is not a Nash equilibrium,
there is a neighborhood V of x, a player i and a Kakutani deviation mapping Φi from V to Xi such that,
for any y ∈ V and any di ∈ Φ(y), ui(di, y−i) > ui(y).
Consequently.
Theorem 51 Any quasiconcave compact game G that has the Kakutani and the regular deviation prop-
erties admits a Nash equilibrium.
Observe that the same statement could be made with approximated equilibria.
5.8 Pseudo equilibrium
Single deviation equilibrium is much too strong: it may not exist. On the other hand, quasi equilibrium
is a refinement that always exists. It improves Reny equilibrium by asking that, instead of a deviation
di that works well for all x
′ close to x, the deviation di may depend on x
′ in a regular manner.
Recall that (x, v) is a quasi equilibrium 25, if and only if, for every i:
sup
V ∈V(x−i)
sup
Φi∈WV
inf
x′
−i
∈V,di∈Φi(x′−i)
ui(di, x
′
−i) ≤ vi,
where WV is the set of multi-valued mapping from V to Xi with closed graph and non-empty convex
values. Is it possible to skip this regularity requirement on Φi (meaning not necessarily with closed graph
and or convex values)? The following analysis shows it is not. The proof in the appendix also shows why
such assumption is somehow necessary to be able to apply at some step the Kakutani [22] fixed point
theorem.
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Recall that (x, v) ∈ Γ is a Reny equilibrium if and only if, for every player i one has:
sup
V ∈V(x−i)
sup
di∈Xi
inf
x′
−i
∈V
ui(di, x
′
−i) ≤ vi,
where V(x−i) denotes the set of neighborhoods of x−i.
One possible improvement would be by exchanging the supremum and infimum above. This leads to
the following concept.
Definition 52 (x, v) ∈ Γ is a pseudo equilibrium if for every player i:
sup
V ∈V(x−i)
inf
x′
−i
∈V
sup
di∈Xi
ui(di, x
′
−i) ≤ vi,
or equivalently, if Vi(x−i) ≤ vi, where Vi is the lower semicontinuous regularization of Vi(x−i) =
supdi∈Xi ui(di, x
′
−i).
Let us show that pseudo equilibrium is a quasi equilibrium without the smoothness condition.
To see why, let us prove that the quantity αi = infx′
−i
∈V supdi∈Xi ui(di, x
′
−i) is equal to βi =
supΦi∈ΩV infdi∈Φi(x′−i),x′−i∈V ui(di, x
′
−i). Where ΩV is the set of multi-valued mapping from V to Xi.
Since the maximizer could use functions instead of correspondences, one obtains that
βi ≥ sup
φi:V→Xi
inf
x′
−i
∈V
ui(φi(x
′
−i), x
′
−i).
The right hand side quantity is easily shown to be equal to αi. Thus, βi ≥ αi. The converse inequality
is trivial because ui(di, x
′
−i) ≤ supd′
i
∈Xi ui(d
′
i, x
′
−i).
Consequently, the unique difference between pseudo equilibrium and quasi equilibrium is the regularity
of Φi (closed graph and non-empty convex values). Without regularity, existence fails as the following
example shows.
Example 53 Consider a quasiconcave compact game with two players. Each player’s strategy set is
[0, 1]. Let u1 be 1 on the diagonal and zero otherwise. Let u2 be 1 on the anti-diagonal and zero otherwise
except for the profile (1/2, 1/2) where u2 is zero and the profile (1/2, 1) where it is 1. This game has no
peudo equilibrium. Actually, Vi(x−i) = 1 for both players: a continuous function. The unique possible
limit vector payoffs are v = (0, 1), v = (1, 0) or v = (0, 0). Thus, Vi(x−i) ≤ vi is impossible for both
players.
As is shown in the appendix, we are constrained to use deviation maps {Φi} that allow the use of a
fixed point theorem. We explore two of them: maps that have a closed graph with non-empty convex
values (in that case one needs the Kakutani property to hold) and constant maps (and then no further
assumption is needed on the topological vector space). A third possibility of deviation maps under which
a relaxed equilibrium will exist is by using continuous functions instead of correspondences. They are
also more easy to check in practice. In that case, one needs the convex compact set X to satisfy the fixed
point property (meaning that any continuous function on X needs to admit a fixed point). Recently,
Cauty [10] proves the Schauder’s conjecture that states that such a property holds when the TVS is
Hausdorff (not necessarily locally convex).
6 Conclusion
For games in mixed strategies, finite deviation equilibrium is easily shown to exist and it refines Reny,
single deviation, weak and Simon and Zame equilibrium. This marriage is impossible in pure strategies
(many of those notions do not exist or differ). Three questions arise: Does pseudo equilibrium in mixed
strategies always exist? Could our solution concepts extend to non quasiconcave compact games in pure
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strategies? Is it possible to refine finite deviation equilibrium in mixed strategies for example to cover
tight equilibrium or generalized weak equilibrium?
To the first question, the answer is negative. Actually, if G is a zero-sum game, pseudo equilibria
exist if and only if the game has a value. Since there are games in pure or mixed strategies without a
value, a pseudo equilibrium may not exist. The proof follows. Let S (resp. T ) denote the compact set of
strategies of player 1 (resp. 2) and let f = u1 = −u2 be a bounded payoff function. Let ((s, t), v) ∈ Γ be
a pseudo equilibrium. Then, there exists sn that converges to s and tn that converges to t such that:
lim
n
sup
s′∈S
f(s′, tn) ≤ v ≤ lim
n
inf
t′∈T
f(sn, t
′),
consequently:
inf
t′∈T
sup
s′∈S
f(s′, t′) ≤ v ≤ sup
s′∈S
inf
t′∈T
f(s′, t′).
That is, the game has a value. The converse is trivial.
To the second question (definition and existence of a tight equilibrium for non quasiconcave compact
games in pure strategies and their sharing rule interpretation), the answer is positive. Moreover, this
extends Bich [5] and Mclennan et al [27]. For the clarity of the presentation, this is solved in a subsequent
paper.
For the last question, observe that any compact-metric game in mixed strategies admits two different
refinements of Reny equilibrium: tight equilibrium and finite deviation equilibrium. The first is con-
structed with respect to robustness against all deviations maps that react in a regular manner to small
perturbations of the opponents strategies. The second is constructed with respect to robustness against
all deviations in finite discretizations of the game, but without the possibility to react to perturbations
of the opponents strategies. The two ideas are different. We are trying to reconcile both of them in one
concept.
However, the FDE could be improved strictly by allowing the finite set of deviations Di’s in its
definition to contain mixed strategies (formally by taking Di as a finite subset of Mi rather of Xi). The
proof of existence is exactly the same.
The challenge now is to confront the new conditions to the variety of potential applications.
Appendix
A) More on approximated equilibria
Definition 54 A game G = ((Xi)i∈N , (ui)i∈N ) is weakly payoff secure at (x, v) ∈ Γ if for every ǫ > 0,
for every neighborhood Wx ×Wv of (x, v), there exists (x′, u(x′)) ∈Wx ×Wv such that for every d ∈ X,
every player i can secure a payoff strictly above ui(di, x
′
−i)− ǫ at x.
Let us now formulate approximately better-reply security condition in the spirit of Reny’s theorem.
A game is called weakly better-reply secure if for every (x, v) ∈ Γ such that x is not an approximated
equilibrium, either: [a] some player i can secure a payoff strictly above vi, or [b] the game is weakly payoff
secure at (x, v).
Lemma 55 Weakly better-reply security is equivalent to approximately better-reply security.
Proof. Let G weakly better-reply secure. We prove that G is approximately better-reply secure,
or equivalently, that if (x, v) ∈ Γ is a Reny equilibrium, then x is an approximated equilibrium. By
contradiction, assume that (x, v) ∈ Γ is a Reny, so satisfies supdi∈Xi ui(di, x−i) ≤ vi for every player
i, and that it is not an approximated equilibrium. Thus, condition [a] is false, so that [b] must be
true: the game is weakly payoff secure at (x, v). Now, let ǫ > 0. Define Wx × Wv to be an open
neighborhood of (x, v), where Wv = {v′ ∈ RN : ∀i ∈ N, | v¯i − v′i |<
ǫ
2 .}. Since G is weakly payoff
secure at (x, v), there exists (x′, u(x′)) ∈ Wx ×Wv, there exists d′ ∈ X such that for every player i,
17
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2012.40
ui(d
′
i, x−i) ≥ supdi ui(di, x
′
−i)−
ǫ
2 . Now, since (x, v) is a Reny equilibrium, supdi∈Xi ui(di, x−i) ≤ vi for
every i ∈ N . Finally, vi ≥ supdi∈Xi ui(di, x−i) ≥ supdi∈Xi ui(di, x
′
−i)−
ǫ
2 ; consequently, ui(x
′) ≥ vi−
ǫ
2 ≥
supdi∈Xi ui(di, x
′
−i)− ǫ, which proves that x is an approximated equilibrium, a contradiction.
Conversely, if G is approximately better-reply secure, then let (x, v) ∈ Γ such that x is not an
approximated equilibrium. Thus, it is not a Reny equilibrium (from approximately better-reply secure
assumption), which implies condition [a] of weak better-reply secure assumption.
Let us apply this characterization to the following zero-sum timing game.
Example 56 Each player’s strategy set is [0, 1]. Let u1(x, y) = e
−min{x,y} for every y 6= x and u1(x, x) =
0. Let G be the mixed extension of this game. It is a quasi-concave compact game. To see that this game
is not better-reply secure, take the sequence of mixed strategies (σn1 , σ
n
2 ), where σ
n
1 is uniform on [0,
1
n ]
and σn2 = 0. Then (σ
n
1 , σ
n
2 , u1(σ
n
1 , σ
n
2 ), u2(σ
n
1 , σ
n
2 )) tends to (0, 0, 1,−1) which is a Reny equilibrium.
However, (0, 0) is not a Nash equilibrium. Now, prove that G is weakly better-reply secure. Assume
(σ1, σ2, v1, v2) ∈ Γ and (σ1, σ2) is not a Nash (and so an approximate) equilibrium.
• If v1 < 1, then player 1 can secure a payoff 1 > v1 at σ, playing a uniform random variable on
[0, 1]. Condition [a] of weak better-reply security assumption holds.
• If v1 = 1, then v2 = −1 and σ1 = 0. To prove that G is weakly payoff secure at σ, prove that
condition [b] holds, i.e. that the game is weakly payoff secure at (σ1, σ2, v1, v2). Take ǫ > 0, and
a neighborhood Wσ ×Wv of (σ, v). Take σn1 uniform on [0,
1
n ] and σ
n
2 = σ2. For n large enough,
(σn, u(σn)) ∈ Wσ ×Wv, u1(σ
n
1 , σ2) > 1 − ǫ and u2(σ1, σ
n
2 ) > −1 − ǫ. Consequently, each player i
can secure a payoff strictly above supdi∈Xi ui(di, σ
n
−i)− ǫ at σ (by playing σ
n
i ).
To conclude, observe that this game is not payoff secure at (0, 0) since player 2 cannot secure a payoff
above −ǫ for every ǫ > 0. Consequently, corollary 44 can be applied, but not Prokopovych [33].
B) Selection lemma
In the following lemma, for every y = (yi)i∈N ∈ RN and every y′ = (y′i)i∈N ∈ R
N , denote y ∨ y′ =
(max{yi, y′i})i∈N ∈ R
N . A multivalued mapping Ψ from X to RN is ∨-stable if for every x ∈ X and
every (y, y′) ∈ Ψ(x)×Ψ(x), one has y ∨ y′ ∈ Ψ(x).
Lemma 57 Let X be a compact subset of a topological vector space. Let Ψ be a ∨-stable multivalued
mapping from X to RN such that for every x ∈ RN , there exists a neighborhood V of x with ∩x′∈VΨ(x
′) 6=
∅. Then Ψ admits a selection ψ = (ψi)i∈N (where ψi is the i-th component of ψ) such that for every i ∈ N
and every α ∈ RN , the set {x ∈ X : ∀i ∈ N, ψi(x) ≤ αi} is open in X.
Proof. For every x ∈ X , let V (x) be a compact3 neighborhood of x such that ∩x′∈V (x)Ψ(x
′) 6=
∅, and choose y(x) ∈ ∩x′∈V (x)Ψ(x
′). Since X is compact, there exist some compact neighborhoods
V (x1), ..., V (xn) of x1, ..., xn, whose interiors cover X . For every x ∈ X , define
ψ(x) = ∨k:x∈V (xk)y(xk). (2)
Since Ψ is ∨-stable, the mapping ψ : X → RN is a selection of Ψ. Now, prove that for every i ∈ N
and every α ∈ RN , the set
Y := {x ∈ X : ∀i ∈ N, ψi(x) ≤ αi} (3)
is an open subset of X . Fix α ∈ RN and let x¯ ∈ Y . We now prove that
V := (∪k:x¯∈V (xk)V (xk)) ∩ (∩k′:x¯/∈V (xk′)
cV (xk′ )) (4)
3 Without any loss of generality, since X admits a compact basis of neighborhoods at every x ∈ X, taking a smaller
neighborhood if necessary, we can assume V compact.
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is a neighborhood of x¯, and is included in Y .
First, V is clearly a neighborhood of x¯ in X : indeed, x¯ belongs the interior of some V (xk) (since
the interiors of V (x1), ..., V (xn) cover X), thus ∪k:x¯∈V (xk)V (xk) is a neighborhood of x¯. Moreover,
∩k′ :x¯/∈V (x
k′
)
cV (xk′ ) is a finite intersection of (open) neighborhoods of x¯.
Second, prove that V ⊂ Y . Fix y ∈ V . From Equation 3, proving y ∈ Y amounts to proving that
for every i ∈ I, ψi(y) ≤ αi. This can be written equivalently, from the definition of ψi (Equation 2): for
every i ∈ I, for every k such that y ∈ V (xk), one has yi(xk) ≤ αi. To prove this last inequality, fix i ∈ I
and k such that y ∈ V (xk). This implies, from y ∈ V , and using Equation 4, that x¯ ∈ V (xk). Using
Equation 2 at x¯ and the fact that x¯ ∈ V (xk), one obtains yi(xk) ≤ ψi(x¯). But since x¯ ∈ Y , one has
ψi(x¯) ≤ αi which finally implies yi(xk) ≤ αi.
C) Existence of tight equilibria
Recall that for every x−i ∈ X−i and every neighborhood V of x−i, WV (x−i) denotes the set of multi-
valued mapping from V to Xi with closed graph and non-empty convex values. Then, for every player
i, every x′−i ∈ V and d
′
i ∈ Φi(x
′
−i), u
Φ
i (d
′
i, x
′
−i) denotes the lower semicontinuous regularization of the
restriction of ui to the set {(ai, b−i) ∈ Xi × V : ai ∈ Φi(b−i)} at (d
′
i, x
′
−i). Denote N (x) the set
of neighborhood of x. If V is a neighborhood of x, denote V−i the neighborhood of x−i obtained by
projecting V on X−i.
We want to prove:
Theorem 58 Every quasiconcave compact game G admits a tight equilibrium: that is, there exists
x ∈ X such that for every neighborhood V of x and every (Φi)i∈N in Πi∈NWV (x−i), there exists z ∈ V
such that for every i ∈ N there exists x′ ∈ V and d′i ∈ Φi(x
′
−i) such that u
Φi
i (d
′
i, x
′
−i) ≤ ui(z).
We prove Theorem 58 by contradiction: assume G has no tight equilibrium. Define the multivalued
mapping Ψ from X to RN as follows: for every strategy profile x ∈ X,
Ψ(x) = {α ∈ RN : ∃V ∈ N (x), ∃(Φi)i∈N ∈ Πi∈NWV−i(x−i) : (1) inf
x′
−i
∈V−i, d′i∈Φi(x
′
−i
)
uΦii (d
′
i, x
′
−i) ≥ αi
(2) ∀z ∈ V, ∃i0 : αi0 > ui0(z)}.
We now check that Lemma 57 can be applied to Ψ.
Step 1: Ψ has non-empty values: indeed, by assumption, for every x ∈ X , x is not a tight equilibrium: by
contraposition of the definition of a tight equilibrium, there exists a neighborhood (which can be assumed
to be compact) V of x and (Φi)i∈N in Πi∈NWV (x−i) such that for every z ∈ V there exists i0 ∈ N such
that for every x′ ∈ V and d′i0 ∈ Φi0(x
′
−i0 ), one has
u
Φi0
i0
(d′i0 , x
′
−i0) > ui0(z). (5)
For every i ∈ N , define αi = infx′
−i
∈V−i, d′i∈Φi(x
′
−i
) u
Φi
i (d
′
i, x
′
−i), so that Condition (1) above is satis-
fied. Moreover, since the restriction of uΦi to the compact set {(d
′
i, x
′
−i) ∈ Xi × V−i : d
′
i ∈ Φi(x
′
−i)} is
lower semicontinuous, αi = u
Φi
i (d
′
i, x
′
−i) for some x
′
−i ∈ V−i and d
′
i ∈ Φi(x
′
−i). Thus, for every z ∈ V ,
from Inequality 5, one has αi0 > ui0(z) for some i0 ∈ N , i.e. Condition (2) in the definition of Ψ(x) is
also satisfied.
Step 2: Ψ is a ∨-stable multivalued mapping: take x ∈ X , α and α′ in Ψ(x). From the definition of Ψ(x),
there exists V ∈ N (x) (resp. there exists V ′ ∈ N (x)), and there exists (Φi)i∈N ∈ Πi∈NWV−i(x−i) (resp.
(Φ′i)i∈N ∈ Πi∈NWV ′
−i
(x−i)), both satisfying:
inf
x′
−i
∈V−i, d′i∈Φi(x
′
−i
)
uΦii (d
′
i, x
′
−i) ≥ αi (6)
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∀z ∈ V, ∃i0 : αi0 > ui0(z) (7)
inf
x′
−i
∈V ′
−i
, d′
i
∈Φ′
i
(x′
−i
)
u
Φ′
i
i (d
′
i, x
′
−i) ≥ α
′
i (8)
∀z ∈ V ′, ∃i0 : α
′
i0 > ui0(z) (9)
For every i ∈ N , define Φ′′i ∈ WV−i(x−i) as follows: Φ
′′
i (x) = Φi(x) if αi ≥ α
′
i and Φ
′′
i (x) = Φ
′
i(x)
otherwise. Define V ′′ = V ′ ∩ V and α′′ = α ∨ α′. To prove that α′′ ∈ Ψ(x), prove that Φ′′ and V ′′
is suitable in the definition of α′′ ∈ Ψ(x). First, from Inequation 7 or Inequation 9, one has: for every
z ∈ V ′′, there exists i0 such that α′′i0 > ui0(z), which proves the second condition of α
′′ ∈ Ψ(x). Second,
for every i ∈ N , if αi ≥ α′i, one has
inf
x′
−i
∈V ′′
−i
, d′
i
∈Φ′′
i
(x′
−i
)
u
Φ′′
i
i (d
′
i, x
′
−i) = inf
x′
−i
∈V ′′
−i
, d′
i
∈Φi(x′−i)
uΦii (d
′
i, x
′
−i) ≥ inf
x′
−i
∈V−i, d′i∈Φi(x
′
−i
)
uΦii (d
′
i, x
′
−i) ≥ αi = α
′′
i
and the case αi < α
′
i is similar. Thus, one has obtained α
′′ = α ∨ α′ ∈ Ψ(x), i.e. Ψ is a ∨-stable
multivalued mapping.
Step 3 : Ψ has open pre-images: this is simply because the two conditions on α in the definition of Ψ(x)
have to be true only one some neighborhood of x.
Thus, we can apply Lemma 57. This provides a selection α : X → RN of Ψ, which satisfies the
openness condition of Lemma 57. To finish the proof of Theorem 58, we apply a fixed-point theorem a`
la Kakutani to the following multivalued mapping Ψ′. Define, for every x ∈ X :
Ψ′(x) = co{d ∈ X : ∃V ∈ N (x) and (Φi)i∈N ∈ Πi∈NWV−i(x−i)
such that for every i ∈ N, (di)i∈N ∈ Πi∈NΦi(x−i) and inf
x′
−i
∈V−i, d′i∈Φi(x
′
−i
)
uΦii (d
′
i, x
′
−i) ≥ sup
x′′∈V
αi(x
′′)}.
First, Ψ′ admits a local multivalued selection Πi∈NΦi(x−i) at every x, this selection having a closed
graph, and nonempty and convex values. Indeed, for every x ∈ X , from the definition of α, there
exists V ∈ N (x) and Φ = (Φi)i∈N ∈ Πi∈NWV−i(x−i) such that for every i ∈ N one has the following
inequality: infx′
−i
∈V−i, d′i∈Φi(x
′
−i
) u
Φi
i (d
′
i, x
′
−i) ≥ αi(x). But from the property of α given by Lemma 57,
the set {x ∈ X : infx′
−i
∈V−i, d′i∈Φi(x
′
−i
) u
Φi
i (d
′
i, x
′
−i)) ≥ αi(x)} is open, consequently Πi∈NΦi(x−i) ⊂ Ψ
′(x)
(taking V smaller if necessary).
Second, Ψ′ has convex images, since it is defined as a convex hull.
Consequently, we can apply the following generalization of Kakutani’s theorem to Ψ′: in the following,
we say that a multivalued mapping F from X to X (where X is a topological vector space) is admissible
if it has nonempty, compact, convex values and has a closed graph. We say that a topological vector
space X has the Kakutani’s property if every admissible mapping F from X to X has a fixed point.
Theorem 59 Let X be a compact subspace of a topological space, with the Kakutani’s property. Let F
from X to X with convex values, such that for every x ∈ X, there exists a multivalued admissible mapping
G on a neighborhood Vx ⊂ X of x into X, such that for every x′ ∈ Vx, G(x) ⊂ F (x) (G is called a local
multivalued selection of F ). Then F admits a fixed point.
Proof. From the compactness of X , there exists a finite subset {x1, ..., xK} of X , and for every
k = 1, ..., K, there exists Gk an admissible multivalued selection of F from some neighborhood Vxk of
xk to X , where Vx1 , ..., VxK is a finite covering of X . Let β1, ..., βK a partition of unit subordinate to
the covering Vx1 , ..., VxK . Thus, each βk is a continuous function from X in [0, 1], with support in Vxk ,
such that for every x ∈ X ,
∑K
k=1 βk(x) = 1. Define G(x) =
∑K
k=1 βk(x)Gk(x). It is clearly an admissible
multivalued selection of F (because F has convex values), so admits a fixed point, which is a fixed point
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of F .
Applying the fixed-point theorem above, Ψ′ admits a fixed point x¯ ∈ X . This means that there exists
d(1), ..., d(K) in X , λ(1) ≥ 0, ...,λ(K) ≥ 0 with
∑K
k=1 λ(k) = 1, such that x¯ =
∑K
k=1 λ(k)d(k) and such
that for every k = 1, ..., K, there is some V ∈ N (x) and some (Φi)i∈N ∈ Πi∈NWV−i(x−i) such that
ui(di(k), x¯−i) ≥ u
Φi
i (di(k), x¯−i) ≥ αi(x¯), the first inequality being a consequence of the definition of u
Φi
i .
But the mapping ui(., x¯−i) is quasi concave. Consequently, from the above inequalities for every
k = 1, ..., K, one obtains ui(x¯) ≥ αi(x¯) for every i ∈ N , which yields a contradiction with Condition (2)
in the definition of Ψ, i.e. the fact that for every z in some neighborhood V ′ of x¯, there exists i0 ∈ N
such that αi0(x¯) > ui0(z).
D) Existence of the lower single deviation equilibrium
A profile x ∈ X is a weak single deviation equilibrium if for every d ∈ X and every neighborhood V of
x, there is z ∈ V , such that for every player i:
∃x′ ∈ V, ui(di, x
′
−i) ≤ ui(z)
Theorem 60 Every quasiconcave compact game G has a weak single deviation equilibrium.
Observe that the theorem does not assume any topological assumption on the topological vector space.
This theorem implies existence of a lower single deviation equilibrium (when the theorem is applied
to quasiconcave utility functions ui) and so also implies corollary 33 established by Reny [35].
The changes with respect the above proof follows.
• (Φi)i∈N ∈ Πi∈NWV−i(x−i) is replaced by (di)i∈N ∈ Πi∈NXi,
uΦii (di, x−i) by ui(di, x−i),
• Ψ(x) = {α ∈ RN : ∃V ∈ N (x), ∃(Φi)i∈N ∈ Πi∈NWV−i(x−i) : (1) infx′
−i
∈V−i, d′i∈Φi(x
′
−i
) u
Φi
i (d
′
i, x
′
−i) ≥
αi (2) ∀z ∈ V, ∃i0 : αi0 > ui0(z)}, is replaced by
Ψ(x) = {α ∈ RN : ∃V ∈ N (x), ∃(di)i∈N ∈ Πi∈NXi : (1) infx′
−i
∈V−i ui(di, x
′
−i) ≥ αi (2) ∀z ∈ V, ∃i0 :
αi0 > ui0(z).}
• and
Ψ′(x) = co{d ∈ X : ∃V ∈ N (x) and (Φi)i∈N ∈ Πi∈NWV−i(x−i)
such that for every i ∈ N, di ∈ Φi(x) and inf
x′
−i
∈V−i,d′i∈Φi(x
′
−i
)
uΦii (d
′
i, x
′
−i) ≥ sup
x′′∈V
αi(x
′′)},
is replaced by
Ψ′(x) = co{d ∈ X : ∃V ∈ N (x) and (di)i∈N ∈ Πi∈NXi
such that for every i ∈ Nand inf
x′
−i
∈V−i
ui(di, x
′
−i) ≥ sup
x′′∈V
αi(x
′′)}.
Then, Ψ′ has nonempty convex values, and has open pre images: Browder-Fan theorem [32] can be
applied (instead of Kakutani’s theorem) to obtain a fixed point of Ψ′. Actually, Browder-Fan theorem
only requires X to be a compact and convex subset of a (possibly non Hausdorff) topological vector
space. Consequently, one obtains the existence of a Reny equilibrium with this weaker assumption on
the strategy space.
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E) Infinite number of players
In sections B), C) and D) above, the finiteness of the number of players is not used: Browder-Fan and
Kakutani theorems are still valid. Thus, in pure strategies, existence of tight, quasi, lower single deviation,
Reny and sharing rule equilibrium hold whatever is the set of players, be it finite or not.
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